Law\u27s Two Lives: Humanist Visions and Professional Education by Sarat, Austin
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
Volume 5
Issue 1 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities Article 14
January 1993
Law's Two Lives: Humanist Visions and
Professional Education
Austin Sarat
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh
Part of the History Commons, and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law & the Humanities by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Austin Sarat, Law's Two Lives: Humanist Visions and Professional Education, 5 Yale J.L. & Human. (1993).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/14
Law's Two Lives: Humanist Visions and
Professional Education
Chris Goodrich, Anarchy and Elegance: Confessions of a Journalist at
Yale Law School. Boston: Little, Brown, 1991. Pp. 285. $19.95.
Richard D. Kahlenberg, Broken Contract: A Memoir of Harvard Law
School. New York: Hill and Wang, 1992. Pp. xiv, 238. $22.95.
Austin Sarat
In his famous parable, "Before the Law," Franz Kafka describes a
man from the country who innocently seeks "admittance to the Law."
"Law, he thinks, should be accessible to every man and at all times."' As
generations of fascinated readers know, in this parable admission is
deferred although never denied, and law turns out to be rather more
inaccessible than accessible, more absent than present.2 The story of the
man from the country is, however, not a story of lost innocence or of
frustrated aspiration; it is, instead, a story of innocence deepened and
aspiration undiminished in the quest for meaning and understanding. In
Kafka's parable, the man from the country grows more innocent as time
goes by and as his desire for admittance to law increases. He remains
unsophisticated and uncorrected even as he sits transfixed with his life
moving inexorably toward its end.
This man dies "before the law" without ever gaining the admission
which he naively expected and to which he felt entitled. Yet law, in
Kafka's parable, is always present as an immortal "radiance" that holds
the man from the country (and us) transfixed by its elusive promise and
aspiration.3 It is precisely in the elusiveness of that promise and aspira-
tion, as much as in the promise or the aspiration themselves, that the
power of law is to be found.
1. Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and Edwin Muir (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937).
2. For an important reading and interpretation of Kafka's parable, see Jacques Derrida, "Devant
Ia Loi," in Kalka and the Contemporary Critical Performance, ed. Alan Udoff (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1987).
3. This argument is advanced forcefully by Drucilla Cornell, "From the Lighthouse: The
Promise of Redemption and the Possibility of Legal Interpretation," Cardozo Law Review 11 (1990):
1687.
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Suppose one were to rewrite Kafka's parable not as a contemporary
story of a single innocent's search for law, but as a story of the quest of
thousands to acquire admission to law school and to acquire, through
that admission, greater nearness to the immortal radiance of law.4 And
suppose further that one were to imagine what it would be like on the
other side of the door in the corridors of law. Kafka himself gives a hint
of how we might proceed in such an imaginative rewriting when he sug-
gests that just beyond every door to law stands yet another door, and the
closer one gets to law the more difficult the task of attaining it.5
Reading Goodrich's Anarchy and Elegance and Kahlenberg's Broken
Contract is like taking a journey through at least one of the open doors to
law, not in acts of imagination, but in accounts of real experiences with
legal education by two men who seem at first glance to be very different
from Kafka's man from the country. Goodrich was, at the time he went
to Yale Law School for a one-year Master of Studies in Law, a thirty-
year-old, freelance journalist, who himself had graduated from Yale Col-
lege. Kahlenberg was, perhaps more typically, a recent graduate of
Harvard College, who having spent a year in Africa on a fellowship,
enrolled in the J.D. program at Harvard.6 What both find in their law
4. For this understanding of the life of the lawyer, see Anthony Kronman, "Living in the Law,"
University of Chicago Law Review 54 (1987): 835.
5. Perhaps this difficulty explains the current state of legal scholarship, in which a now well-
established legal academy finds itself awash in grand theories all of which proclaim that their
perspective is the "rosetta stone" which will finally and fully capture the essence of law's radiant
immortality. With the slow accretion of academic knowledge of law, the stakes in professional legal
education get higher and the difficulty of making a mark requires ever escalating claims to have
broken through another door to law. David Luban illustrates this development in legal education in
the following story about the testimony of Yale Professor George Priest at the confirmation hearings
of Robert Bork. Priest, Luban writes,
contended that "Bork's academic writings are slashing. They art hypercritical. They are
extreme. ... Nevertheless, Priest maintained, these writings should not be taken as an
indicator of Bork's judicial temperament. The reason, according to Priest, lies in the difference
between the role of the scholar and that of the judge. The judge must be open-minded,
moderate, and respectful of previous authority. Since World War II, however, "there has been a
vast change in the style of modem legal scholarship .... Those scholars competing in the front
rank on the frontier of legal scholarship have very self-consciously adopted the style of research
and scholarship of the natural sciences .... The competition among these scholars is over who
will announce and who can confirm some dominant theory of the law, and these scholars
compete much like athletes seeking records or much like 17th and 18th century explorers
seeking new discoveries. They compete to promote new theories and new ideas around which
new fields of law will be reorganized .. "
See "Introduction: We Copernicans," unpublished manuscript, 1992, 1-3.
In this condition, the legal academy is divided into warring camps, fads develop and pass with
increasing rapidity, and, as the periods of rotation grow shorter, more and more energy gets invested
in making this or that small distinction seem to be of monumental importance. In this condition,
some might sometimes wish that, like the man from the country, they had never crossed the thresh-
old of law.
6. When I enrolled in law school friends urged me to "keep a diary" and write a book to replace
The Paper Chase as the definitive "expose" of the life and times of the law student. See John Jay
Osborn, The Paper Chase (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1971). I resisted, in part, because I couldn't
figure out who would read such a book. Now I find myself confronting that question again, only this
time in the guise of a reviewer of the work of two people who gave into the very temptation I had
resisted. Yet again, I wonder who actually reads books like Anarchy and Elegance and Broken
2
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school experiences is in many ways quite unsurprising, a testimony per-
haps to their own rather unexpected innocence and to the innocence of
American legal culture. In other ways it is quite revealing of some of the
dilemmas of modem law and legal education, such as the persistent dia-
lectic of formalism and realism and the continuing power of corporate
capital in shaping the nature of the legal profession.
Yet Anarchy and Elegance and Broken Contract tell two rather differ-
ent stories. The former is entirely devoted to the first year experience. At
the core of its concerns is "the effort to trace the development of the legal
frame of mind" (p. 5). This book is written by someone whose experience
in law school was not tethered to a projected future in law. Kahlenberg's
book, in contrast, is mostly about issues of personal commitment and
vocational choice that face someone wanting to practice law. The central
dramatic movement of his book is captured in the fact that while 70 per-
cent of his classmates entered Harvard Law School wanting to practice
public interest law, only 2 percent of them actually do so. We watch
Kahlenberg himself wrestle with the question of whether he will end up
as one of that 2 percent. Kahlenberg argues that most other "what it is
really like in law school" books concentrate on the first year experience.
His book, in contrast, shows that what is "remarkable" about Harvard
Law School is "not the rigor of its first year, but the transformation that
takes place in the second and the third" (p. 5).
Both Goodrich's and Kahlenberg's stories, however, are ultimately
personal stories of lost innocence. Their stories rely on vivid images of
inside and outside, of lives led before law school which are lost on the
inside, of what I call a "humanist" vision of learning or service defeated
by the requisites of professional education.7 In this vision, what is prized
in law is its capacity to cultivate our humanity and our capacity to
engage in moral action.' In this vision, it is "impossible fully to under-
stand law without a deep and sympathetic knowledge of the liberal arts.
Contract. Do they have a wide public appeal? Do they cater to a deeply felt, voyeuristic curiosity
about what law schools do to their students? Are they read mostly by anxious undergraduates trying
to decide whether they want to go to law school? Or are they really just cultural artifacts, of keenest
interest to scholars of the legal profession and historians of legal education?
I really cannot imagine that the public could get too excited trying to figure out the role of law
schools and the meaning of legal education. Or that there is much public interest in whether law
schools should seek, through their educational methods and practices, to transform the practice of
law and the profession, or should seek instead faithfully to reproduce its operating premises. Or that
the public really is invested in figuring out to what extent legal educators should take seriously the
discomforts and disappointments of their students, if, at the same time, what their students find
discomforting and disappointing is precisely what readies them to succeed in the profession? Yet no
matter who is reading such "my years at law school" books, these questions are as old as law schools
themselves and are debated in an expansive ocean of articles, books and conferences into which this
essay will gently fall.
7. For one useful explication of the humanist vision, see James Boyd White, "Law as Rhetoric,
Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life," University of Chicago Law Review 52
(1985): 684.
8. See James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). See also Kronman, supra note 4.
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But that knowledge cannot be just background, it must be a fundamental
part of legal scholarship."9 The humanist vision seeks to "restore to legal
studies a proper place for the question of values." 10 In both Anarchy and
Elegance and Broken Contract one sees, once again, the distance between
professional education and the humanities, between the schooling of a
lawyer and schooling which seeks to cultivate character and humane
judgment. If at schools like Harvard and Yale the professional model is
so strong, and the influence of the humanities so slight, one can imagine
what the situation is like at law schools more divorced from the univer-
sity as a whole, as well as those with less intellectual pretention."
By reading Goodrich's and Kahlenberg's accounts of personal change
and transformation, of discomfort and surprise as they confront the stark
realities of professional schooling, we learn as much about the image of
law in popular culture as we do about the law itself. 2 Indeed I often
found myself asking how could such clearly intelligent men as Goodrich
and Kahlenberg come to law school with such naive and unformed
expectations. And if they-graduates of Yale and Harvard Colleges-
have such expectations, what about the rest of the population?' 3
While sometimes Goodrich and Kahlenberg sound like latter-day
Holden Caulfields, and while sometimes their tone is one of self-indul-
gent, whiny dissatisfaction, they help us understand why it is that legal
education survives in its current form even as they describe the disap-
pointment, boredom, and disillusionment which generations of law stu-
dents have endured. Indeed, I will argue that it is precisely what
Goodrich and Kahlenberg criticize that accounts for the staying power
of the current form of legal education. As a result, the question that these
books raise is whether the humanist vision can be reconciled with the
prevailing model of professional education or whether a new institutional
vehicle is needed to nurture and sustain it.
I. SEARCHING FOR THE LEGAL MIND
Perhaps the oldest idea about law school is that it is a place where
students learn to think like lawyers rather than to practice law. Goodrich
in Anarchy and Elegance puts the idea that law schools teach their stu-
9. Guido Calabresi, "Introductory Letter," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1 (1988): vii.
10. See Owen Fiss, "The Challenge Ahead," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1(1988): x.
11. It is worth noting that these books are about Harvard and Yale rather than Michigan,
Stanford, or U.C.L.A. Harvard and Yale occupy rather unique places in the popular imagination;
they are perceived as standing closer to the "immortal radiance of the law." And given the success of
their graduates that perception is by no means simply fanciful.
12. See Stewart Macaulay, "Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of Schools,
Entertainment, and Spectator Sports," Law & Society Review 21 (1987): 185. See also Stewart
Macaulay, "Popular Legal Culture: An Introduction," Yale Law Journal 98 (1989): 1545.
13. Similar expectations seem to be widespread. See Sally Merry, Getting Justice and Getting
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dents a distinctive style of thinking at the center of his story. He goes
searching for the legal mind and discovers positivism, the view that law is
distinct, self-contained, and bears no necessary connection to any ethical
values, 14 and realism, the belief that legal rules and decisions are not
compelled by logic but are rather the products of artful manipulations,
skillful interpretive moves, plays of rhetoric, and political motivations. 5
Goodrich is both surprised and disappointed by these discoveries. His
surprise tells us something about the state of our legal culture, and his
disappointment tells us something about his own expectations and
beliefs. It is, I think, somewhat amazing that a well-educated American
could go to law school thinking that law, as it is currently practiced, is
both an instrument of moral justice and a hermeneutic system in which
rules, once arrived at, compel the decisions of judges. As pervasive as
positivism and realism are in the legal academy, neither seems to have
taken hold in the broader culture.16 Students come to law school as
innocents, uneducated or undereducated about law, only to be taken
aback by what they find there.'
7
This suggests that part of the problem of legal education is that it is, in
fact, ghettoized in law schools and that so little systematic attention to
law is found in our schools, colleges, and universities. At least if students
were acquainted with the way law works before law school, their choices
to enter the legal academy might be better informed and some of the
stresses and strains of professional education might be minimized. In this
sense there may be a great unmet potential for a partnership between law
schools and colleges in which law schools encourage and support the
development of systematic education in law at the undergraduate level.
Throughout his year at Yale Goodrich encounters the systematic
privileging and rewarding of particular kinds of arguments while others
are systematically dismissed or stigmatized. He describes at length a class
in Civil Procedure with Geoffrey Hazard, a class in which both positiv-
ism and realism were vividly on display. The positivism of legal educa-
tion was revealed to him in the way that "Hazard's approach to law
seemed to empty it of moral content. He glossed over the social context
of Swann [the case under discussion]; he seemed more interested in the
case's legal maneuvering than the justice of his clients' position" (p. 39).
In Goodrich's first taste of realism, Hazard taught:
If you think law supports your side, you try to show how neatly the
14. For a powerful statement of the positivist vision, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).
15. For a useful discussion of the assumptions of realism, see Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at
Yale, 1927-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).
16. Lawrence Friedman, "Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture," Yale Law Journal 98 (1989):
1593.
17. For a discussion of the appalling lack of legal education and understanding in the general
population, see A. Barlett Giamatti, "The Law and the Public," The Record 34 (1982).
Sarat
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law's pegs, round or not, correspond to your case's round holes; if
you think it doesn't, you whittle the law's pegs, or chisel the fact's
holes, to look square. Often, and if properly done, you can distort
the facts or the law ... just enough so the case turns not on the
dispute in question but on your skill as an advocate.... The ability
to read the minds of judges and other lawyers seemed more impor-
tant. . . than the rights and values at stake (p. 39).
In a classic moment of understatement Goodrich says, "It sounded
awfully manipulative to me" (p. 39).
Goodrich tells other vivid, wonderful stories about his teachers, his
classes, the mundane details of doing his first library research assign-
ment, and writing his first memo and brief. Each of these experiences
reinforces the positivist and realist assault on Goodrich's humanist vision
of law. Among the most interesting of these is the story he tells of his first
assignment in Constitutional Law, Bowers v. Hardwick. He recalls listen-
ing as his teacher unraveled Bowers and paid particular attention to its
relevance to the controversy about abortion. Goodrich describes how he
came to understand the way Justice White framed the issue to be decided
and the way that framing of the issue was essential to the result of the
case.18 This experience was both distressing and exhilarating. As Good-
rich puts it, "I felt angry, almost ill, when I understood that Hardwick's
prosecution had been reduced to a game of strategy" (p. 28). At the same
time, he says that he felt "awe" at being able to understand the subtext of
the decision (p. 28). He "saw for the first time the deep seduction of the
law. How could you witness that power, analyze it, walk around it, and
not want to harness it yourself?" (p. 29).
Goodrich presents a nice comparative reading of the rhetorical strate-
gies of Bowers and Marbury v. Madison. Chief Justice Marshall's opin-
ion, he concludes, was an apt precursor for Justice White and for much
of legal education in that it was both "brilliant and brilliantly deceptive"
(p. 59). Goodrich argues that:
[Marshall] could have said right off that the Supreme Court had no
jurisdiction in Marbury, but he didn't, because he had other fish to
fry. He had the chance, he realized, to make the Supreme Court the
ultimate referee of law, and that the best way to ensure that result
was to decide that both the plaintiff and the defendant were
wrong.... Marshall, in Marbury, had acted like a Greek god during
wartime. He helped one side, then the other, all the while enjoying
the combatants' false conviction that they are following their own
free will .... It remained a 'great case,' to be sure-not because it
18. For an interesting discussion of the use of such techniques in the framing of judicial opinions,
see Robert Ferguson, "The Judicial Opinion as a Literary Genre," Yale Journal of Law & the
Humanities 2 (1990): 201.
206 [Vol. 5: 201
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eliminated politics from the law, however, but because it buried poli-
tics so deeply within it (pp. 59-60).
When, several weeks after these encounters with Professor Hazard,
Justice White, and Chief Justice Marshall, Goodrich faced the challenge
of writing his first legal memorandum and drafting his first brief, he
found himself able and willing to do exactly what he had so recently
found "awfully manipulative." "I had achieved the ability," Goodrich
says, "basically, to impose a characterization on the Dove County case as
disingenuous as Justice White's characterization of Bowers. . . . I had
begun to read the world in legal terms, to believe it was not only right but
necessary to impose my views on other people. If life is a jigsaw puzzle,
the lawyer's job is to place a handful of pieces on the table and convince
his viewers they saw a complete picture--even though the lawyer, more
than anyone, knows the picture is fragmentary" (p. 95).
Anarchy and Elegance is at once an homage to, and a critique of, posi-
tivism and realism in legal education. As we have already seen, Goodrich
found himself seduced by the legal mind, in awe of the way lawyers are
taught to think. He tells us that he "felt addicted to law. Law was so
thrillingly empowering" (p. 115). Like Kafka's man from the country,
Goodrich was fascinated by law's awe-inspiring power even if, at the
same moment, he knew that power to be dangerous and destructive. As
he masters the skills of legal research, he writes, "Give an attorney a
library, a pen, and paper, and he could tame chaos. It was a power of
amazing proportions-and only just beyond my grasp" (p. 55). He him-
self reports that he was "drawn to law's power as much as repulsed by its
effects" (p. 57).
Yet, if there is any dramatic tension in the book it is found in the
question whether Goodrich will be able to learn to think like a lawyer
without, at the same time, losing his soul. "Law," Goodrich writes,
"made me less human, asked that I dismiss my moral center as a danger-
ous, incomprehensible Pandora's box" (p. 115). As he puts it, "My year
at law school convinced me that legal education has a way of replacing
everyday human values with what I can only call 'legal' values-values
that sustain the system of law rather than the people that system was
created to serve" (p. 4). He reports his own sense of "pride" in "being
able to do battles with lawyers on their own turf" (p. 95), even as he
ardently proclaims both his fidelity to the humanist vision that "law had
meaning beyond that manufactured in lawyers' heads" (p. 97), and his
fear that giving in to positivism and realism would "kill something
important in me" (p. 97).
On his account, law schools, like other "total institutions," are quite
successful at desocializing and then resocializing their "inmates." 19
19. See Erving Goffman, Asylums (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1961).
Sarat
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While legal education is "deeply transformative" (p. 5), there are, in fact,
several episodes where Goodrich seems on the verge of being fully con-
sumed by the style of thinking he learns at Yale only to be rescued by a
strong dose of self-knowledge. One episode in particular caught my
attention. In this episode, Goodrich goes home to San Francisco for fall
break, after approximately six weeks of law school. He is invited to din-
ner with two long-time friends and reports that
... our relationship, now, was qualitatively different from what it
had been before; this time around I found myself attempting to
establish a pecking order right off the bat. Mark and I talked foot-
ball, as we had always done during our regular Sunday brunches,
but I soon decided the conversation was trivial and insufficiently
challenging. I didn't want to share a moment of friendship; I wanted
to lock horns, to show my stuff, even to intimidate.... I told Alice
that her cooking reminded me of... (an) issue that had come up in
Torts-the different levels of care someone owes to social guests,
business visitors, and trespassers. Did Alice recall what standard
applied should I hit my head on an open kitchen cabinet?... Could
Mark's barbecuing be classified as an "attractive nuisance"... And
what if Alice's flank steak killed me? ... (W)hy did I insist, now, on
making myself feel different, superior? It was a new habit of mind,
one I had picked up since going to Yale Law ... (I)n emphatically
fostering students' intellectual selves, law school gives them-me, in
this case-license to ignore the more problematic, uncontrollable,
emotional aspects of life . . . Law school hadn't turned me into a
jerk, but it told me that if I felt the need to be a jerk, I should be a
first-rate jerk ... and not feel guilty about it (pp. 111-113).
Here Goodrich suggests that law school is less deeply transformative
than it is enabling; it makes available to law students and lawyers tools
with which to express their own worst selves. And some occasionally
give in to the temptation to use those tools.
But if one were to grant Goodrich his argument that law school is, in
fact, "deeply transformative," one might immediately ask both what law
school transforms and into what. Goodrich is less clear about what it is
to which legal education is opposed than he is about what it produces. As
to the former, the enemy of legal education seems to be moralism and
moral judgment. Students, Goodrich argues, learn to think like lawyers
by being made suspicious of their own moral intuitions and beliefs. Those
intuitions and beliefs are treated either as an inadequate basis for legal
decision-making or as simply irrelevant. Legal education at Yale, despite
its distinctive pedagogical traditions and its deeply intellectual culture,
nonetheless empties law of "moral content" and makes law into a sterile
"intellectual exercise" (p. 39). It seeks to eliminate "all nonlegal points of
reference" (p. 40). This emptying of moral content and elimination of
nonlegal reference points becomes the model for the lawyer who is able
[Vol. 5: 201
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to represent positions and make legal arguments on all sides of a question
regardless of the intrinsic moral worth and value of those positions and
arguments.
Learning the positivist and realist orthodoxy of legal education is
essential if one is going to be successful as a lawyer in the current cli-
mate, and it helps explain why lawyers have a "substantially different
outlook on life than nonlawyers" (p. 6). That outlook is "hyperrational,
adversarial, and positivistic" (p. 4). It is this that is the great discovery of
Goodrich's one year at Yale. The "immortal radiance" of law turns out
not to be justice, but intellect, not moral commitment, but technical com-
petence. Instead of being a temple of justice, law school turns out to be
merely a place where smart people learn to wield the weapons of legal
argument. Legal education devalues those parts of the self which do not
measure up even as it emphasizes truths which once discovered turn out,
in Goodrich's view, to be "beside the point" (p. 5).
It is, of course, precisely the capacity of law schools to impart those
truths and help students acquire those tools that is, from the point of
view of the organized profession, responsible for their survival and influ-
ence. Law schools equip their graduates to participate in what David
Luban calls the "dominant picture" of the lawyer's role.20 What students
like Goodrich find alienating (as well as fascinating) is precisely what law
schools need to teach if they are to be regarded as useful by the profes-
sion. Law schools provide support for a dominant conception of profes-
sionalism in which lawyers accept a segregation of "role" morality from
common morality. In this conception, lawyers acting as lawyers "may be
morally required to do things that seem immoral."2 In addition, in the
dominant conception, the existence of an adversary system of justice
heightens the duty of lawyers to their clients while diminishing their duty
to respect the interests of "adversaries or of third parties."22 This is well
illustrated in the following account of a well-known lawyer's response to
a hypothetical dilemma posed as part of the Public Broadcasting Sys-
tem's series on Ethics in America.
... in a case of murder ... the killer claims that he killed reluc-
tantly; he seeks counsel, and every lawyer extends, to this client, the
protection and shield of his confidence .... Particularly adamant
here was Mr. James Neal from Tennessee. . . . The killer finally
reveals to Mr. Neal that he was responsible for yet another inadver-
tent killing; that another man had been convicted for his crime; and
that the man who was wrongfully convicted was about to be exe-
cuted.... Mr. Neal held his ground; he would not yield up informa-
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tion, even to save the life of an innocent man .... Would he really let
an innocent man be executed? "Absolutely... people die every day.
It may sound harsh, but we have values to serve."
23
Both role morality and what Luban calls the "adversary system excuse"
contribute to Neal's willingness to let an innocent die in the name of
"values" which he does not name and could not defend. His is a concep-
tion of professionalism that "identifies professionalism with extreme par-
tisan zeal on behalf of the client and the 'principle of nonaccountability,'
which insists that the lawyer bears no moral responsibility for the client's
goals or the means used to attain them."24
Mostly Goodrich's story is one of disorientation and disappointment
as he encounters and learns the lessons of positivism and realism. But the
news for loyal Yalies is not all bad. Goodrich notes that the first year of
Yale Law School was "among the most rewarding [experiences of his]
... life" (p. 3). Of course, after reading the book, and hearing about the
depth of his first-year frustrations and confusions, if the year at Yale Law
ranked so high in his life one is tempted to wonder about the kind of life
Goodrich has led. But there are rewards amply demonstrated in Anarchy
and Elegance.
Goodrich glimpses the "humanist" vision of law in the orientation for
first-year students when Dean Guido Calabresi urged students to "love
and take care of one another" and warned that "excellence was a neces-
sary part of becoming a good lawyer, but without humanity and decency,
skill in law was worthless" (p. 18). This, Goodrich writes approvingly,
was "law with a human face" (p. 19). What Goodrich subsequently
describes is the process by which that human face becomes a lawyer's
face. But, at least for one moment, another possibility presented itself.
That possibility was also at least occasionally glimpsed in Calabresi's
Torts class. In that class, Calabresi was able to teach the lessons of real-
ism without fully embracing positivism. "Guido," Goodrich reports,
"continually frustrated the class by defining a rule only after talking
about its effects.... [H]e adopted this approach in order to impress upon
us the enormity of the temptation to apply a known rule to a new situa-
tion, regardless of its fit." At the same time, Goodrich says that Cala-
bresi's approach to law "fought complacency" by insisting that "lawyers
were duty-bound to ensure that the laws they implemented worked no
harm, however hidden that harm might be" (pp. 79-80).
Goodrich catches a third glimpse of the humanist vision in a seminar
entitled Images of Law. In that class legal texts were juxtaposed to liter-
ary texts. Students were asked to confront directly law's exclusion of
sympathy, its devaluation of the human, and its elevation of the elegance
23. See Austin Sarat, "Crossing Boundaries: Teaching Law in the Liberal Arts," in Teaching
What We Do, ed. Peter Pouncey (Amherst, Ma.: Amherst College Press, 1991), 53-54.
24. Luban, supra note 20, xx.
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of logical solutions to legally-framed problems over the anarchy of life
itself. This was the one class in which Goodrich found that the professor
"didn't want us to 'think like lawyers' but to think for ourselves. If the
professor had an agenda, it was to help students get in touch with their
own values.. ." (p. 223). In this class "students could talk openly about
feeling and belief" (p. 226). It was this class that became, for Goodrich, a
mechanism "through which to reclaim legal education" (pp. 226-227).
In the end, Goodrich seems not to have succeeded in that reclamation
project. An exhortation at orientation, an inspiring Torts professor, and
one law and literature class do not amount to a revolution in legal educa-
tion. The dominant conception of lawyering requires what legal educa-
tion provides and the lesson legal education teaches, namely to submerge
"common beliefs about justice beneath the legal system's rules of justice,
even though those rules may ensure justice is not done" (p. 266). If the
humanities encourage an insistent curiosity and an unwillingness to fore-
close the life of the imagination, law school offers up its graduates to the
profession as less curious, less imaginative, but more ready to attain
"power, money, and prestige" in return for a "Faustian diminishment of
the soul" (p. 284). If the liberal arts liberate, legal education turns out, on
Goodrich's account, to be "an expensive kind of straightjacket" (p. 284).
II. SELL OUT Now, BEAT THE RUSH
The Big Chill was, in my view, one of the signal pop culture events of
the eighties. This cynical, trashing, vapid, yuppie movie about the ago-
nies of dying passions and lost dreams seemed to say to a generation "sell
out now, beat the rush." The question of whether and when to sell out is,
for Richard Kahlenberg, author of Broken Contract, the defining issue of
his law school experience. The Faustian bargain which Goodrich
describes at the end of his book turns out to be, on Kahlenberg's account,
the key to understanding legal education. Learning to think like a lawyer
has its parallel in the choice of what kind of law to practice, and it turns
out that the vocational lessons of legal education are the same as its class-
room pedagogy, namely to renounce idealism, conform to standard pro-
fessional aspirations, and, in so doing, separate one's professional life
from one's personal commitments.25 Thus Kahlenberg says that his book
will try to explain "how is it that so many students can enter law school
determined to use law to promote liberal ideals and leave three years
later to counsel the least socially progressive elements of our society" (p.
5).
In his application to Harvard Law School, Kahlenberg said that he
25. What Kahlenberg experiences is not atypical. See Robert Stover, Making It and Breaking It:
The Fate of Public Interest Commitment During Law School (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1989). Also Robert Granfield, Making Elite Lawyers: Visions of Law at Harvard and Beyond (New
York: Routledge, 1992), chapters 4 and 5.
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wanted to dedicate a career in law to "public service... to work within
the law to make life a little more fair for people" (p. 3). In Broken Con-
tract he describes himself as "an upper-middle class, educated, good-gov-
ernment liberal.. ." (p. 14). Kahlenberg enters law school as a carrier of
the humanist vision; ". . . I wished the [law school] curriculum were
broader and less trade-oriented-a continuation of a liberal arts educa-
tion .... " (p. 132); "I had come to law school expecting it to be a contin-
uation of a liberal arts education" (p. 140). And while he, like Goodrich,
caught glimpses of that vision in legal education (for him Robert Coles'
course, Dickens and the Law, plays a role similar to the role Images of
Law played for Goodrich), by his second year Kahlenberg's reliability as
a carrier of the vision is substantially in doubt. At that point he no longer
believes what he said in his application. "All the application rhetoric
sounded silly .... I had come to believe that the right career move,
whatever your ultimate goal, was to work for a powerful corporate law
firm" (p. 4). His book is devoted to describing what he labels the "insidi-
ous pressure" (p. 5) which made his application's rhetoric seem silly and
which undermined his class's commitment to public interest work.
The most important components of that insidious pressure are, accord-
ing to Kahlenberg, "power, prestige, and convention" (p. 7). The legal
profession pays honor to those who do work that is "respectable" rather
than those who do work that is "admirable"26 (p. 7). Salary becomes the
arbiter of achievement and Kahlenberg suggests that even progressive
forces honor this sociological logic. Democratic Presidents rely on Lloyd
Cutler and Clark Clifford, not Marian Wright Edelman and Ralph
Nader, for advice and counsel. So the lesson seems clear: "sell out now,
beat the rush."
Like Goodrich, Kahlenberg went to law school in search of law's
"immortal radiance" with a vision that law could and should express
one's deep moral and political commitments. He went to "do good," only
to find that the environment encouraged him and his colleagues to "do
well" instead. He faults Harvard Law for failing to live up to what he
calls its "enormous potential" (p. 8). While he never directly names what
that potential is, it is, I think, the potential that law has to be a vehicle
for righting wrongs. Law school should take the fact that "every once in
a while many of us... see ourselves in To Kill a Mockingbird, defending
the innocent victim of racial prejudice, or as Ralph Nader taking on
GM" (p. 138) and turn those embryonic visions of law as the hand-
maiden of justice into a lifelong career. Thus Kahlenberg continuously
faults his teachers for failing to inspire him (e.g., "I wish people like
[Anthony] Lewis who've written stirring books like Gideon's Trumpet
26. For an interesting discussion of prestige and status in the legal profession see, John P. Heinz
and Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1982), chapter 4.
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would realize that small words of encouragement, gestures of interest,
can mean the world to a student" [p. 92]; "What really disappointed me
about Duncan Kennedy was his inability to inspire . . ." [p. 165]).
In this search for inspiration and the realization of potential he, like
Goodrich, notes the tension between professional education and the
humanist vision of law: "I had learned how to spot circular reasoning
and how to see when an argument proves too much. But I also knew my
classes seemed to be dulling my idealism and passion for justice" (p. 59).
Broken Contract again reminds us of the deep ignorance and misunder-
standing about law and the legal profession that afflict our culture. How
could Kahlenberg have gone to Harvard thinking that it was an eager
training ground for public interest or poverty lawyers? How could he
have known so little about the organization of the profession as not to
know of the power and influence of the major corporate law firms?
Kahlenberg provides a careful description of the way career choices
are made and of the forces that shape those choices. In particular he
emphasizes the importance of the sorting process in legal education. This
process begins on the first day in law school and is perhaps most fully
exemplified in the way first semester grades shape subsequent possibili-
ties. Everything seems to be about ranking. "The Law Review editors,"
Kahlenberg argues, "would be invited to the dinner parties, have a
chance to clerk for the Supreme Court, feel the exhilaration of having the
world at their doorsteps" (p. 64). Given the accuracy of this perception,
one wonders why Kahlenberg himself tried so hard-albeit unsuccess-
fully-to make the Law Review and to obtain a judicial clerkship (aided
by Lawrence Tribe and Anthony Lewis). For someone struggling to use
law to do good, Kahlenberg's choices and possibilities do not seem all
that unconventional. Thus his first summer was spent working in the
prestigious Manhattan District Attorney's Office, his second summer at
Ropes & Gray (a prestigious corporate law firm). In each of these acts
one can see the slight erosion of commitment, the erosion of a humanist
vision by someone drawn to the traditional markers of success.
Kahlenberg suggests that Harvard conveys a not-so-subtle double
message about public interest practice. On the surface, straightforward
encouragement of public interest commitment is communicated by such
luminaries as James Vorenberg and Abe Chayes. Thus Vorenberg used
the opening orientation session to "earnestly [advise] us to consider pub-
lic-interest law as an alternative to a corporate-law career .... He said
public interest could be more rewarding than private practice" (pp. 30-
31). Yet to Kahlenberg, Vorenberg's admonition seemed quite anoma-
lous; Vorenberg himself had begun his career at Ropes & Gray, delivered
his admonition about public interest law in the Ropes & Gray Room at
Harvard Law School, and was comfortably ensconced as Dean of the
Law School. "Here was the dean, in the room named after the law firm
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where he once worked, singing the virtues of public interest. Didn't he
sense the irony?" (p. 31).
But is there really an irony here? Kahlenberg's idea of public interest
practice is, from the start itself an elite and, at best, reformist vision.27
Public interest practice is fully compatible with, and may be essential in
its legitimation role to, the maintenance of the very structure which
allows firms like Ropes and Gray to have rooms named after them at
places like Harvard.28 There is nothing ironic about the containment of
the humanist vision within the confines of a corporate structure, about
liberalism sponsored and disciplined by the very structures to which it is,
in theory, opposed.
Kahlenberg seems obsessed with the question of how liberalism and
liberals can live within those structures-public interest being praised in
the Ropes & Gray room, liberals like Vorenberg and Cutler practicing
law in large corporate firms. "[Tihe central question of my memoir,"
Kahlenberg writes, "was whether a liberal could, in good conscience,
work at a corporate law firm" (p. 100). But one wonders why this is such
a question for him when he so easily dismisses poverty law as "social
work" and seeks a platform to "change the world" (p. 75). One wonders
why this is such a question when he notices that the lawyers who get the
high-level government jobs, "even in Democratic administrations" (p.
101) are "invariably attorneys from corporate firms" (p. 101). Here
Kahlenberg might have noted what almost every progressive scholar
since the start of the twentieth century has noted, namely the way so-
called liberal politics in the United States is fully inscribed in a capitalist
political economy.29 Proving one's credentials as a "safe" liberal is as
important for liberal activist lawyers as is reassuring the stock market for
Democratic presidential candidates.
Perhaps his inability or unwillingness to comprehend this symbiotic
relationship between liberalism and capitalism explains his hostility to
Critical Legal Studies (CLS), a complex intellectual and political move-
ment within the legal academy which emphasizes among other things the
indeterminacy of law and its availability as a tool of, rather than restraint
on, power.3" Kahlenberg's hostility to CLS plays an unusually vivid role
in his critique of Harvard. Here, of course, there is an obvious contrast
with Anarchy and Elegance which, not unexpectedly, makes no mention
of CLS. CLS has, after all, had almost no presence at Yale since the so-
called "purge" of some of its early sympathizers. While Kahlenberg
presents himself as politically progressive, he has little patience or sym-
27. See Robert Gordon, "Bargaining With The Devil," Harvard Law Review 105 (1992): 2041.
28. See Austin Sarat, "Book Review: Access to Justice," Harvard Law Review 94 (1981): 1911.
29. See Charles Lindblom, Politics and Markets" The World's Political Economic Systems (New
York: Basic Books, 1977).
30. See Peter Fitzpatrick and Alan Hunt, eds. Critical Legal Studies (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1987). Also Mark Kelman, Critical Legal Studies (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
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pathy for CLS. His book turns out, as much as anything else, to be a
liberal attack on the left.
Kahlenberg suggests that the adherents of CLS whom he encountered
were, for the most part, self-indulgent and hypocritical, disillusioned by
their own inability to head off the stampede of their students into corpo-
rate practice and, at the same time, partially responsible for that stam-
pede. At various points in Broken Contract, Kahlenberg accurately
describes CLS's critique as most powerfully directed at the liberal
assumptions which animate people like him, in particular the belief that
liberalism can somehow be decoupled from capitalism. CLS warns of
what he painfully discovered in law school, namely the substitution of
the mainstream, dominant conception of professionalism for the human-
ist idealism of many of Harvard's entering students. If there is blame to
be handed out, one would have thought that Kahlenberg would have
directed most of it to the institutions of corporate America which sustain
that conception. Yet there is almost nothing in this book to suggest that
Kahlenberg has any systematic understanding of the dynamics which
support and sustain the kind of law practice which he condemns. 1
Instead, he faults CLS for its cynicism and its "nihilism" (p. 23),
which, he believes, paradoxically free students to give in to the tempta-
tions to use money and power as the measure of professional success.
From his teachers he seems to crave inspiration and example. What he
encounters from advocates of CLS are pretense and pretentiousness, and
comfortable radicalism, dressed up in discomforting, and inaccessible,
jargon. "[T]hat's Critical Legal Studies-playing squash in cutoffs; teach-
ing at the great prestigious law school and thinking of oneself as the van-
guard of the proletariat; trying to be radical but only in the most
traditional context" (p. 84). Kahlenberg values engagement in projects of
social reform, but finds CLS surprisingly disengaged: "While the liberals
were out fighting, Duncan Kennedy was busy writing dense pieces for
publications like the Buffalo Law Review, pages few people read and even
fewer understood" (p. 78).
"Crits," Kahlenberg argues, pretend to be interested in humanizing
legal education, but they are as standoffish and aloof as any other
Harvard professors. They pretend to care about and value teaching, yet
somehow inexplicably line up to defend Clare Dalton, whom Kahlenberg
describes as "the worst teacher I ever had" (p. 46). It is, of course, odd
that so much of Kahlenberg's "hatred for Harvard Law School" is
directed at the crits, until one remembers that crits are for him threaten-
ing models of fallen liberals, examples of people like himself whose com-
mitment to using law as a tool of social justice was tested, tried, and
31. See Magali Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1977). See also Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in
Modern America (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).
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frustrated. He reminds us that "they [crits] had believed that they could
employ legal techniques to further justice but soon discovered that the
system was not a set of neutral techniques available to anyone... but a
game heavily loaded in favor of the wealthy and powerful" (p. 23).
Instead of spending so much time railing against CLS, Kahlenberg might
have done his argument a service by directing his fire against the concen-
trations of power that distort and corrupt the ideals of professionalism,
that turn the ideal of disinterested service into the pursuit of profit.
In the end, Broken Contract seems all too often to be a self-indulgent
rattling of what a former colleague of mine would have called
Kahlenberg's "golden chains." Late in the book I ran out of patience
with Kahlenberg's need to find someone who would understand "what I
was going through" (p. 186) in the choice between a job at Covington &
Burling, and a job on the staff of Senator Charles Robb. Can the human-
ist commitment be authentic in a person who takes himself and his privi-
leges that seriously? How deep could his understanding be of the
meaning of lawyering in the public interest if he could so narrowly focus
on a choice unavailable to 98 percent of the persons to whom such lawy-
ering would be most important and most helpful?
III. CONCLUSION
Law schools, almost since their inception, have been torn between two
masters: one the university, with its insistence on an open, scholarly
understanding of law, the other the organized legal profession, with its
demands for the production of disciplined professionals. If any schools
are likely to be able to serve the university and distance themselves from
the profession, one would imagine that Harvard and Yale would be
prime candidates. While in many ways they do distance themselves from
the profession and ally themselves with what I have called the humanist
vision of law, both Anarchy and Elegance and Broken Contract indicate
that even at these schools the profession-with its emphasis on positiv-
ism and realism-holds sway.
Kahlenberg ends Broken Contract by arguing that the arrangement of
institutions matters in facilitating or inhibiting the daily struggle of indi-
viduals with "our good and bad impulses" (p. 235). He suggests that "we
might want to restructure our social institutions in order to make it a
little easier to be good" (p. 235). Echoing Goodrich, "law," he proclaims,
"is supposed to be about justice" (p. 237). For me the question which
these books raise is whether law schools can ever attain sufficient dis-
tance from the organized legal profession to pursue the mission of mak-
ing it a little easier for lawyers to do good in their lives in the law. For
Kahlenberg's and Goodrich's humanist vision to have a chance, the




Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 14
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol5/iss1/14
Sarat
What is, of course, most startling about legal education is how resilient
it has been over the course of nearly a century,32 and how resistant it has
been to changes in its basic form and mission despite generations of com-
plaints similar to the ones Goodrich and Kahlenberg exemplify.3 3 That
resilience and resistance are possible because legal education does exactly
what the dominant conception of professionalism requires. Law
schools-even Harvard and Yale-are not liberal arts colleges precisely
because their mandate is to train and mold lawyers to fit into a profession
which itself values doing well more than doing good.
For legal education to nurture and sustain a humanist vision of law, to
keep alive the idea that law is, among other things, a species of moral
argument, either the dominant conception of lawyering is going to have
to change or new forms of legal education are going to have to develop
which have greater distance from the profession and its dominant con-
ception.3 4 As to the former, I am not optimistic. As to the latter, perhaps
Kafka is right that the closer one gets to law the more powerful the
obstacles to the realization of its "immortal radiance."
This suggests that the kind of liberal arts approach to law that both
Goodrich and Kahlenberg value can be best sustained in places other
than law schools. The humanist vision is done a disservice if legal educa-
tion is left entirely to the law schools. As the late A. Bartlett Giamatti
wrote when he was President of Yale,
The Law is not simply a set of forensic or procedural skills. It is a
vast body of knowledge, compounded of historical material, modes
of textual analysis and various philosophical concerns. It is a formal
inquiry into our behavior and ideals that proceeds essentially
through language. It is a humanistic study-both as a body of mate-
rial wrought of words and a set of analytic skills and procedural
claims involving linguistic mastery . . . To argue, therefore, for
courses in the parts, principles and purposes of law is not to argue
for 'professional' training in college in the techniques, accumulated
lore and diverse iterations of method that training for the profession
also entails. It is rather to argue for philosophic, textual and histori-
cal concerns, as one would argue for the teaching of any humanistic
... inquiry.... It is to argue that the medium of cohesion and
conflict, ligature and litigation, that is the law, must be part of the
educated person's perspective in order to appreciate one of the
grandest, systematic ways of thinking human beings have developed
32. See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983).
33. For an example of an earlier version of such criticism, see Louis Brandeis, "The Opportunity
in Law," in Business-A Profession (Boston: Hale, Cushman and Flint, 1933).
34. See Jerold Auerbach, "What Has the Teaching of Law to do With Justice," New York
University Law Review 53 (1978): 458. See also, Richard Wasserstrom, "Legal Education and the
Good Lawyer," Journal of Legal Education 155 (1984).
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for their survival. 3
Perhaps if Goodrich and Kahlenberg had had a systematic education in
and about law before they entered law school, the humanist vision which
each brought to the door of law would not so quickly or so easily have
given way. Perhaps the humanistic life of law would then have had a
better chance against the prevailing professional vision.
35. Giamatti, supra note 17, 36-37.
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